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pAbstract
State-owned enterprises (SOEs) play a crucial role in China's economy. Those directly
controlled by the central government (CSOEs) take leading positions almost in all
industries in China. In this paper, we analyse the impacts of internal control quality of
CSOEs on related party transactions and corporate value of CSOEs after the Chinese
government introduced regulatory changes and the split share structure reform.
Current literature offers little empirical evidence in this area. The primary information
collected from 167 questionnaires responded by 22 CSOEs is analysed using
structural equation models. We find that internal controls of a higher quality reduce
unfair related party transactions for private benefits at the cost of corporate value
and hence increase the corporate value of CSOEs. However, the overall perception of
the internal control quality of CSOEs is not satisfactory with a mean of 5.3174 based
on a seven-point Likert scale. This indicates that effective implementation of internal
control is critical for CSOEs after setting up regulations and systems.
Keywords: Internal control; Related party transactions; Corporate value; CSOEsBackground
The internal control of a good quality can reduce accrual and real earnings manage-
ment and firms that disclose auditor's internal control report have lower level of earn-
ings management (Fang and Jin 2011). However, we know little from the previous
literature whether the quality of internal controls has any impact on related party
transactions and corporate value. Such research question is of a great importance in
the Chinese context. During the last decade, internal control systems have been estab-
lished in most listed companies and some unlisted companies in China. Recently, the-
oretical and empirical studies on the quality of internal controls in the Chinese context
emerge. However, due to the complicated situation and information unavailability, little
direct evidence is reported for the effects of internal control on corporate value (Lin
et al. 2007).
Previous studies in this area only analyse internal controls of listed firms in China.
Our study focuses on state-owned enterprises directly controlled by Chinese central
government (CSOEs) because they are distinct from listed firms. CSOEs have a com-
mon controlling shareholder - the government. Because of their powerful controlling
shareholder, CSOEs have competitive advantages in almost all trades. CSOEs generally2014 Tong et al.; licensee Springer. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
icense (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
rovided the original work is properly cited.
Tong et al. Journal of Chinese Management 2014, 1:1 Page 2 of 14
http://www.journalofchinesemanagement.com/content/1/1/1are large business groups with complicated group structures. Most of the CSOEs have
one or more listed companies. Consequently, CSOEs are different from other listed
firms in strategies, operations and internal controls. To overcome the data unavailabil-
ity problem faced by other researchers in this area, we conducted a survey to all CSOEs
in China and received 167 questionnaires (Additional file 1) responded by employees
from 22 CSOEs. As far as we know, a survey is the only way to obtain the information
on the efficiency of internal controls in CSOEs.
The primary agency relationship between shareholders and managements (Jensen
and Meckling 1976; Ang et al. 2000; Singh and Davidson 2003; Zhong et al. 2010) has
been studied thoroughly in Anglo-Saxon contexts. Different from these country con-
texts, agency problems amongst the controlling shareholders, institutional investors, in-
dividual investors (Li et al. 2004; Yang 2006; Jian and Wong 2010) and members of
business groups (Shao and Liu 2008; Xie and Wang 2010) are more critical in China.
In particular, agency problems in CSOEs are complicated by issues like insider control
(Zhong et al. 2010; Ma et al. 2012) and ownership concentration accompanied with an
‘absence of the owner’(Liao and Fang 2005; Bai and Wu 2008). These may result in ad-
verse economic consequences given the leading positions of CSOEs almost in all indus-
tries. Chinese regulators, therefore, pay particular attentions to the quality of internal
controls of CSOEs.
Efficient internal control can, to some extent, prevent the self-interested behaviours
resulting from agency problems in incomplete contracts, for example, unfair related
party transactions, managerial opportunism and earnings management (Li et al. 2004;
Meng and Zhang 2006; Rao et al. 2008). In this paper, we focus on the impact of in-
ternal control quality on related party transactions because such transactions can be
managed by related parties and directly influence corporate value. According to FASB
No. 57, related parties are defined to include three basic categories of individuals: board
members, executives and principal owners (owners of more than 10% of voting inter-
ests of the enterprise). Considering the influence power of these stakeholders in CSOEs,
related party transactions attract more attention from researchers and regulatory en-
tities than unrelated party transactions. Fair related party transactions have arm-length
prices and normal business processes, which efficiently fulfil underlying economic
needs of the company (Gordon et al. 2004). However, unfair related party transactions
under a weak governance system with agency conflicts are often used to transfer wealth
for private benefits of related parties (Chen and Wang 2005; Cheung et al. 2009).
This paper offers twofold contributions to the literature. First, it demonstrates the
relationship between internal control and related party transactions in CSOEs. The
internal control is evidenced to be related to financial reporting (Doyle et al. 2007;
Altamuro and Beatty 2010; Skaife et al. 2013), earnings quality (Fang and Jin 2011), risk
and cost of capital (Ogneva et al. 2007; Dhaliwal et al. 2011) and management guidance
(Feng et al. 2009). One neglected area of research is whether internal controls affect
managerial incentives in related party transactions. Our paper provides empirical evi-
dence that the quality of internal controls in CSOEs constrains unfair related party
transactions. Second, our paper evaluates the efficiency of internal control and tests the
mediation effect in CSOEs based on insiders' judgments. It is normally difficult or even
impossible for outsiders to evaluate the efficiency of internal control of CSOEs. As
such, evaluations from outsiders normally base on the outcomes such as related party
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starts from the insiders' evaluation to the internal control of their employers and then
analyses the impact of internal control on related party transitions and corporate value.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The ‘Methods’ section reviews rele-
vant literature, develops our hypothesis in the context of the regulation background and
introduces the data and models. The ‘Results and discussion’ section reports the results.
The ‘Conclusions’ section summarizes the findings and concludes the paper.Methods
Literature review and hypothesis development
Internal controls and economic consequences
According to the Treadway Commission, the term ‘internal control’ is related to con-
trols over financial reporting, operational tasks such as product quality assurance and
plant maintenance (NCFFR 1987). The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) requires the
implementation of many new rules and procedures (Ge and McVay 2005). Section 404
especially requires that managers maintain adequate internal controls over financial
reporting and provide an auditor-attested assessment of their effectiveness in the an-
nual report (Ogneva et al. 2007). Since 2002, SOX and other regulations have been is-
sued and implemented to ensure the internal control qualify of firms. There has been a
surge of research on the economic consequences of internal controls. Due to the lim-
ited public information on the internal control of firms, research in this area often fo-
cuses on internal control deficiencies (Bedard and Graham 2011). Material weakness in
internal control tend to be related to deficient revenue recognition policies, lack of seg-
regation duties, deficiencies in the period-end reporting process and accounting pol-
icies (Ge and McVay 2005). Weak internal controls are associated with lower accrual
quality (Doyle et al. 2007; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2008). Because of the agency problem,
the profitability of insider trading is significantly greater in firms disclosing material
weaknesses in internal control relative to firms with effective control (Skaife et al.
2013). Weak internal controls are also found to be associated with the cost of debts.
On average, a firm's credit spread on its publicly traded debt marginally increases if it
discloses a material weakness (Dhaliwal et al. 2011). Kim et al. (2011) further find that
the loan spread and the loan rates are higher for internal control-weak (ICW) firms
than for non-ICW firms, after controlling for other known determinants of loan con-
tract terms. If the internal controls remain ineffective, the less accurate guidance per-
sists but is mitigated if the internal control problems are remediated (Feng et al. 2009).
The management forecast errors are larger when the internal control problems are
most likely to affect interim numbers and thus guidance. The impact of ineffective
internal controls on forecast accuracy is three times larger when the weakness relates
to revenues or the cost of goods sold (Feng et al. 2009). In summary, internal control
quality has economically significant effects on accounting policies, accrual quality, cost
of debts and management guidance.
Regulations related to the corporate internal control in China
Internal controls have not been mandatorily required to be implemented in Chinese
listed firms until 2006 due to a series of regulatory changes.
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2006. After the Reform, the China Security Regulatory Committee (CSRC hereafter) is-
sued ‘Measures for the Administration of Initial Public Offering and Listing of Stocks’,
which requires internal controls for listed companies for the first time. According to
this regulation, companies in the initial public offering (IPO) process must have a
sound and effective internal control system that should guarantee the reliability of fi-
nancial reports, compliance with laws and regulations, efficiency and effectiveness of
business operations. The efficiency of the internal control system should be assessed by
public certified accounting with an assurance report on internal control. This regula-
tion issued by the CSRC should be complied by all the IPO firms no matter whether
they are SOEs or non-SOEs.
The second regulatory change in 2006 was ‘Comprehensive Risk Management Guidance
for CSOEs’ (the Guidance hereafter) issued by the State-owned Assets Supervision and
Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC hereafter). SASAC performs
investor's responsibilities for CSOEs, i.e. supervising the preservation and increment of
CSOEs' corporate value as well as managing the state-owned assets of the enterprises by
regulations. The Guidance for CSOEs requires that their internal control system should
help risk management and include all the major business processes, such as strategy, in-
vestment, marketing, accounting, producing, etc.
Third, the Ministry of Finance, CSRC and other three commissions issued ‘The Basic
Internal Control Norms for Enterprises’ in 2008 and ‘The Enterprise Internal Control
Guidelines’ in 2010 (the Guidelines hereafter). Listed companies in Shanghai and
Shenzhen stock exchanges have to comply with these two sets of regulations from
2012. Unlisted firms of large and median sizes are also encouraged to comply with
the Guidelines. Similar to the internal control objectives in CSRC's regulations, five
components should be structured in the internal control system of a firm, includ-
ing control environment, risk assessments, information and communications, con-
trol activities and monitoring.
The internal control quality of listed firms and CSOEs is regulated by the government
using the above-mentioned Guidance and Guidelines. Because most of the CSOEs have
one or more listed companies, CSOEs must abide both the Guidance and the Guide-
lines by preparing internal control reports for the Ministry of Finance and risk manage-
ment reports for SASAC. Some recent evidence shows that the quality of the internal
control of CSOEs is different from that of other listed firms. For instance, the internal
control of CSOEs is more efficient than that of other listed firms (Cheng and Wang
2008). However, Leng and Ding (2011) find that the disclosure of internal control is
negatively related to the proportion of state ownership. Since SOEs including CSOEs
tend not to disclose information on internal controls to the public, it remains unclear
in the literature the effect of internal controls of CSOEs.
Internal control and related party transactions
Through related party transactions, cash and profits can be diverted away from firms
either to controlling shareholders or to assist troubled firms within the group (Jian and
Wong 2004). For example, controlling shareholders loot their own firms during the
emerging market crisis of 1997 to 1998. Firms in developed markets also use rela-
ted party transactions to transfer assets and profits out of firms for the benefit of
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been under the limelight in a number of recent US and European accounting scandals,
such as transactions between Enron and its special-purpose entities. Related party
transaction is prevalent in China due to the corporate structures, economic institutions
and the legal system. According to the 2001 annual reports of Chinese listed firms, 90%
of them are involved in different degrees of related party transactions (Jian and Wong
2004). State-owned groups are usually formed out of a number of related large-scale
SOEs. Because of their planned economy tradition, SOEs tend to have more related
party transactions within the group than non-SOEs. As such, related party transactions
are more prevalent in CSOEs than in other listed firms.
By manipulating transfer prices, economic resources can be transferred between dif-
ferent stakeholders, resulting in gains to some and losses to others. Related party trans-
action may distort financial statements leading to greater information asymmetry and a
general erosion of investors' confidence in the firm. To the best of our knowledge, there
is no empirical research on whether and how internal control has any impact on related
party transactions, especially in CSOEs, although some papers study the relationship
between corporate governance and related party transactions. Corporate governance
has direct effects on related party transactions (Kohlbeck and Mayhew 2004), and
weaker corporate governance mechanisms are associated with more and higher dollar
amounts of related party transactions (Gordon et al. 2004). The quality of corporate
governance is important in deterring the use of manipulated transfer prices in related-
party sales transactions (Lo et al. 2010).
According to the contract theory and the agency theory (Jensen and Meckling 1976),
various stakeholders take part in corporate contracts with different interests and asym-
metric information (Grossman and Hart 1986). Related party transactions can be used
by controlling shareholders and/or top executives for their own private benefits at the
cost of deteriorating corporate value. Internal control is designed to help the orga-
nization accomplish specific goals, one of which is improving operational outcomes to
achieve the strategic objective. A healthy and effective internal control system can pre-
vent insiders tunnelling the firm (Kohlbeck and Mayhew 2004). Of course, not all the
related party transactions are value-destroying. Fair related party transactions are effi-
cient and cost-saving. Due to information asymmetry, outsiders cannot distinguish the
quality of related party transactions. Companies that really need to engage in fair
related party transactions may suffer from stakeholders' criticism. The most im-
portant stakeholder of CSOEs is SASAC because of its influence on important de-
cisions of CSOEs including related party transactions despite the fact that SASAC
cannot make any direct influence through multiple agency relationships. CSOEs
may build a better reputation by adopting and disclosing a good internal control
system designed to prevent tunnelling or manipulating by related party transactions. This
leads to our hypothesis 1:
Hypothesis 1: effective internal control in CSOEs can enhance the fairness of related
party transactions.
Related party transactions and corporate value
Related party transactions arise as efficient contracting arrangements in situations invol-
ving incomplete information (Ryngaert and Thomas 2007). Related party transactions
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the corporate value (Zhou and Zhang 2008). But under a weak governance, related party
transactions are often viewed as unfair and being detrimental to outside shareholders
(Chen and Wang 2005; Cheung et al. 2009). Both tunnelling (Johnson et al. 2000; Rao
et al. 2008; Berkman et al. 2009) and propping (Friedman et al. 2003; Jian and Wong
2010) are controlled by insiders - controlling shareholders and top executives. Negative
cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) have been found for companies that disclose related
party transactions (Stouraitis et al. 2006). Tobin's Q and market-to-book value are signifi-
cantly lower for firms undertaking potentially expropriating transactions (Lei and Song
2011). Similar evidences also have been found in listed companies in Shanghai and
Shenzhen stock exchanges based on a pre-Reform sample (Li et al. 2004).
Before the Reform, controlling shareholders' stocks were non-tradable on stock mar-
ket. As a result, controlling shareholders were indifferent to the stock price but have
motivations in getting private benefits via unfair related party transactions (Meng and
Zhang 2006). After the Reform, stocks hold by controlling shareholders become tra-
dable, which may reduce their incentives in exploiting minority shareholders via unfair
related party transactions.
Although CSOEs are not wholly listed, most of them have one or more listed subsid-
iaries. According to ‘The Guiding Opinions about Promoting the Adjustment of State-
owned Capital and the Reorganization of State-owned Enterprises’ issued by SASAC,
CSOEs are encouraged to become wholly listed or to allocate assets of a high quality
into their listed companies. Furthermore, CSOEs are required to follow both the Guide-
lines on internal control and the Guidance for risk management after the Reform.
Under such changes in regulatory environment, CSOEs are expected to manage related
party transactions more carefully than before.
Considering these regulatory and economic factors, we can safely infer that related
party transactions influence corporate value as it determines controlling shareholders'
support to listed companies after the Reform. Therefore, we construct hypothesis 2:
Hypothesis 2: in an effective internal control system, related party transactions will be
beneficial to CSOEs' corporate value.
Data and models
We collect data from a survey to CSOEs based on two reasons. First, the related data
at the group level are not available. Before whole listing of the CSOEs, they only need
to disclose the information on listed companies within the groups. Second, the internal
control quality is very difficult to be evaluated exactly by outsiders. Various proxies of
internal control quality have been used in academic studies and practices, such as the
disclosure of material weaknesses (Ge and McVay 2005), auditor's internal control re-
port (Lin and Rao 2009) and indices based on a matrix of various ratios (Wang et al.
2011). No matter what measures to be used, the internal control is not the same as fi-
nancial reporting with quantity contents and standard forms. Considering information
unavailability from the public disclosures, insiders' opinions based on an anonymous
promise are better proxies than outsiders' conjectures and deductions.
In addition, the information related to the internal control of CSOEs is not disclosed
to the public because of their sensitive ownership structure. A survey is the only feas-
ible approach for us to gather the data for our research. Although the data collected via
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ensure that the results of our survey are objective and reliable. Firstly, the survey was
sent to all listed CSOEs to make the data selection process to be random rather than
biased. Secondly, we sent the questionnaires to employees at different positions in
CSOEs, ranging from executive managers and financial managers to other staffs in fi-
nancial departments. This further reduces the self-selection bias in our data collection
and enhances the objectiveness in the responses. In empirical analyses, we also test the
reliability and validity of the collected data.
We design the questionnaire through a trail survey. Before the formal investigation,
we arranged a trail survey participated by seven professors, five experts from four
CSOEs and 34 MBA students. According to the results from the tests, we correct some
expressions, delete some items and finalize the questionnaire for the formal investiga-
tion. In addition to participants' basic information like ages and positions, we design
three major parts in the finalized questionnaire by using a seven-point Likert scale in
the questionnaire. The first part is an overall evaluation including 11 questions about
the internal control quality of the CSOEs the participant is working for. The second
part includes 5 components of internal control with at least 10 questions for every
component. The third part is for the relationships between internal control quality and
business operations as well as between related party transactions and corporate value,
to which 18 questions are related. The participants are employees of CSOEs, and they
are required to score each question based on their own perception and judgment for
their companies.
With the support of SASAC, we sent out 250 questionnaires to all listed CSOEs and
received 167 valid responses, including those from China Petrochemical Corporation
(Sinopec), China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and other 20 CSOEs. The
response rate is 66.8%. Majority of the participants (95%) are employees from accoun-
ting or finance departments of CSOEs, which ensures that the participants have
professional knowledge to evaluate internal control, related party transactions and
corporate value.
Definitions of main variables are given in Table 1 with the numbers of supporting
questions (items).
Descriptive analyses to the main variables are reported in Table 2. According to
Table 2, the means of internal control and its five components are all slightly higher
than 5, indicating that the participants of the survey general perceive the internal con-
trol system as useful. Amongst the five components of internal control, IAC has theTable 1 Variable definitions
Variables Definitions Number of supporting questions (items)
ICQ Internal control quality is good 11
CE Control environment is good 14
RA Risk assessment is reasonable 9
IAC Information and communication are quick 11
CA Control activities are effective 13
M Monitoring effect is good 10
RPT Fairness of related party transactions is enhanced 7
CV Corporate value is increased 11
Table 2 Descriptive statistics
Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
ICQ 5.3174 1.2276 2 7
CE 5.4731 1.1021 2 7
RA 5.3293 1.1794 2 7
IAC 5.7305 0.9659 3 7
CA 5.3832 1.1603 1 7
M 5.4252 1.1994 2 7
RPT 5.4551 1.0511 2 7
CV 5.5928 0.9949 2 7
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imums of other variables. These show that the participants of the survey perceive the
information and communication to be efficient within the CSOEs. RA has the lowest
mean of 5.3293, indicating that the risk assessment in CSOEs is not as satisfactory as
other components of internal control. Besides, the means of internal control is low than
the average of the means of the five components whereas the standard deviation of in-
ternal control is 1.2276, which is higher than the standard deviations of all the five
components. These indicate that participants of the survey have more conservative and
distinct perceptions of the internal control system due to its complexity. The relatively
high means of RPT (5.4551) and CV (5.5928) indicate that participants of the survey
generally agree that a better internal control quality reduces related party transactions
and enhances the corporate value.
Results and discussion
The ratio of our sample size to the number of free parameters in a structural equation
model is 5 to 1 as recommended by Bentler and Chou (1987). Because each part of in-
ternal control quality has around 10 questions while the effective sample number is
168, we try to reduce the dimension to yield more powerful results.
Principal component analysis
In multiple regressions, using a large number of independent variables may cause the
dependent variable to be regressed against a large number of covariates. Retaining all
covariates will likely lead to severe multicollinearity or non-identifiability of regression
coefficients. Variable selection techniques are not often very effective, and we are inter-
ested in including information from all of the covariates. Based on these considerations,
we conducted principal component analysis. Principal component analysis enables us
to find a small set of linear combinations of the covariates, which are uncorrelated with
each other, to avoid the multicollinearity problem. It also ensures that the linear combi-
nations chosen in our regression design have the maximal variance.
We use a scree plot in principal component analysis. A scree plot identifies the prin-
cipal components which are shown as the turning points in the plot. The principal
components are sorted in decreasing order of variance, so the most important principal
component is always listed first. The cumulative variance explained by the identified
principal components should reach above 85%. Then we get the structural equation















































Figure 1 SEM based on PCA.
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five components of internal control, related party transactions and corporate value in
the structural equation model (SEM).
Table 3 reports the fit criteria of the SEM. Almost all the absolute fit indices are at
satisfactory levels. According to Table 3, the p value of χ2 of the structural equation
model is 0.062, which satisfies the criterion that the p value of χ2 should be greater than
0.05. The goodness-of-fit index (GFI) and adjusted goodness-of-fit index (AGFI) also
satisfy the criterion of being greater than 0.9. Although root-mean-square error of ap-
proximation (RMSEA) does not satisfy the criterion, its value is very close to the ac-
ceptable standard. The means of all comparative fit indices are greater than 0.9, which
satisfy the criteria. In addition, all three parsimonious fit indices, i.e. parsimonious
goodness-of-fit index (PGFI), parsimonious normed fit index (PNFI) and normed chi-
square (NC), reach the acceptable standards. Overall, the fit criteria of the structural
equation model are satisfied.
We can test the relationship amongst internal control quality, related party transac-
tions and corporate value based on this model with reasonable confidence. The results
are shown in Table 4. According to Table 4, the C.R. (Critical Ratio) value of paths
‘ICQ→ RPT’ and ‘RPT→CV’is greater than 1.96, which passed the reliability test. The
coefficients of both paths are positive (0.846, 0.794) at the 5% significance level. The
coefficient of the path ICQ→ RPT is significantly positive, indicating that a better
internal control quality enhances the fairness of party related transactions. This finding
supports our hypothesis 1. The positive coefficient of the path RPT→CV shows that
Table 3 Fit indices in the structural equation model based on PCA
Measures Standards Values
Absolute fit indices













NC 1 < NC < 3 1.487
Tong et al. Journal of Chinese Management 2014, 1:1 Page 10 of 14
http://www.journalofchinesemanagement.com/content/1/1/1the improved fairness of related party transactions increases corporate value. Therefore,
the prediction of our hypothesis 2 is also supported.
Mean value
We use the mean value of the items in a given part to reduce dimensions as a robust
test for the empirical analyses conducted in the ‘Principal component analysis’ section.
The structural equation model using mean values is illustrated in Figure 2. The test re-
sults are reported in Table 5. According to Figure 2 and Table 5, the findings remain
consistent with those from Figure 1 and Table 3. All the absolute fit indices are at satis-
factory levels. According to Table 5, the p value of the χ2 of the structural equation
model is 0.055, which is greater than the required p value of 0.05. GFI and AGFI also
satisfy the criterion of being greater than 0.9. Similar to the finding in Table 3, RMSEA
does not satisfy the criterion, but its value is very close to the acceptable standard. TheTable 4 Path estimates in the structural equation model based on PCA
Estimate C.R. p value
CE→ ICQ 1.158
RA→ ICQ −0.245 −2.7 ***
IAC→ ICQ 0.168 1.642 0.101
CA → ICQ −0.221 −1.911 *
M → ICQ 0.095 0.884 0.377
ICQ → RPT 0.846 15.835 ***
CE→ CE1 0.896
CE→ CE2 −0.399 −5.408 ***
ICQ → ICQ1 0.926
ICQ → ICQ2 0.037 0.465 0.642
RPT→ CV 0.794 10.698 ***






























Figure 2 SEM based on the mean value.
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three parsimonious fit indices, i.e. PGFI, PNFI and NC, also reach the acceptable stan-
dards. These prove that the fit criteria of the structural equation model are satisfied.
We test the relationship amongst internal control quality, related party transactions
and corporate value based on this model with reasonable confidence. According to the
results shown in Table 6, all the variables passed the validity test and all the paths in
the structural equation model based on mean values are significantly positive at the 5%
level. Especially, the estimates of ICQ to RPT and PRT to CV are 0.797 and 0.771, re-
spectively. These findings are consistent with those reported in Table 4. Both theTable 5 Fit indices in the structural equation model based on the mean value
Measures Standards Values
Absolute fit indices













NC 1 < NC < 3 1.801
Table 6 Path estimates in the structural equation model based on the mean value
Estimate C.R. p value
ICQ → RPT 0.797 14.816 ***
RPT→ CV 0.771 10.369 ***
ICQ → CE 0.900
ICQ → RA 0.889 18.802 ***
ICQ → IAC 0.907 19.862 ***
ICQ → CA 0.884 18.489 ***
ICQ → M 1.020 29.294 ***
*** indicate significance levels at 10% and 1%, respectively.
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ter internal control quality enhances the fairness of the related party transactions,
which increases the corporate value. As such, the predictions of our hypothesis 1 and
hypothesis 2 are supported by the results reported in Table 6.
Conclusions
There is a recent surge of academic interest in internal control quality and its effects
on different types of organizations. For example, causes and consequences of internal
control problems have been analysed for non-profit organizations (Petrovits et al.
2011). Most studies investigate the internal control quality of listed firms because of
their superior disclosures on internal control issues than other types of organizations.
Previous studies find that the quality of internal controls is associated with the account-
ing policies (Ge and McVay 2005), earnings quality (Doyle et al. 2007; Ashbaugh-Skaife
et al. 2008), cost of debts (Dhaliwal et al. 2011; Kim et al. 2011) and management fore-
casts (Feng et al. 2009) of the firm. However, existing literature provides little evidence
on the effects of the internal control quality on the related party transaction and cor-
porate value. Our study contributes to the literature by analysing the effects of the in-
ternal control quality of a special type of organization, i.e. CSOEs, which are business
groups fully controlled by Chinese central government. In China, the internal control
quality of CSOEs is particularly regulated by the government in the Guidance, and
SOEs have more related party transactions than non-SOEs. We provide evidence that
the quality of internal controls of CSOEs enhances the fairness of related party transac-
tions and corporate value.
We gather the data through a survey to CSOEs and analyse the primary data using
the structural equation model. Based on the contract theory, we use related party trans-
actions as the mediator between internal control quality and corporate value. We hy-
pothesize that a better internal control quality in CSOEs can enhance the fairness of
related party transactions, which leads to an increased corporate value, which are both
supported by the empirical evidence in our study. The results remain robust even if we
use the mean values of variables in the structural equation model.
Our survey also offers a number of practical implications. The participants in the sur-
vey are not very satisfied with the quality of internal controls in their companies, and
we could expect more improvements in the future. The weakest links in internal con-
trol systems are risk management and control activities according to the survey results,
which are difficult to be implemented effectively in such large business groups as
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ternal control system.
The survey helps us to get insiders' opinions on the internal control of CSOEs that are
not available from public information. Findings in this study enhance our understanding
of whether and how the quality of internal control has any impact on related party trans-
actions and corporate value. We contribute to the existing academic literature by demon-
strating these relationships in CSOEs that take leading positions almost in all industries in
China. Our findings for CSOEs as leading SOEs provide meaningful implications to other
SOEs, which pave an avenue for future research. For example, we may further compare
the internal controls of CSOEs, SOEs and non-SOEs. Such comparisons would be inter-
esting especially in the context of Chinese capital market. Furthermore, this study pro-
vides implications for future regulatory changes, in China and elsewhere, to improve the
internal control and to constrain manipulations in related party transactions.
Additional file
Additional file 1: Sample questionnaire.
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